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1. Introduction
During  the  last  decade,  countries  whose  rural  sector  had  been  collectivized  have  made  considerable
progress  towards  establishing private property rights  and restructuring  of agricultural  production.  Even
before  the collapse  of the  Soviet  Union  and  the  large-scale,  though  uneven,  move  towards  individual
property  rights  that  is  described  elsewhere  (Csaki  et  al.  2002),  China  has,  in  1978,  established  the
Household Responsibility System,  leading to a large surge in agricultural production (Lin 1992) and other
Asian  countries  such  as  Vietnam,  Laos,  and  Cambodia,  have  abandoned  collectivization  and  moved
towards  formulation  'of new  land  laws.  Problems  associated  with  collective  farming  also  led  to  the
disappearance  of collectives  in  other  countries  such  as  Ethiopia,  Mozambique,  and  Nicaragua,  three
countries that made the transition towards  individual land rights in the  1990s (Nega 2002,  Tanner 2002,
Deininger and Chamorro 2003), similar to a considerable  strengthening of private land use rights adopted
elsewhere,  e.g. in the context of Mexico's  1992 Constitutional Reforms  (World Bank 2002).
However,  although  all of these reforms have improved  individuals'  authority over land use, the extent to
which land can be transferred, either through rentals or sales, varies considerably.  In fact, many transition
countries have imposed restrictions  on the ability to effect land transfers  out of fear that these may have
negative impacts on either efficiency or equity. Whether or not such restrictions are appropriate  is subject
to considerable  debate;  some researchers have cautioned against premature liberalization of land markets
(Lastarria.-Cornhiel  1997, Platteau  1996)  or even to warn about outright negative consequences  of doing
so (Manji  2003).  Available  empirical  evidence to  support judgments  remains thin, characterized  by two
main shortcomings.
On  the  one  hand,  there  is  often  little  distinction  between  the  two  types  of land  transfers.  This  is  of
relevance  as one would expect land rental  and sales markets to respond to market imperfections  in rural
areas  of  developing  countries  in  very  different  ways.  It  is  well  known  that,  in  the  presence  of
imperfections  in more than one market, enabling households  to freely engage  in land market transactionsmay not contribute  to greater productivity but instead lead to re-concentration of land. The relatively thin
evidence  available,  e.g.  from Chile  (Echenique  and Rolando  1990)  and Honduras  (Carter  and  Salgado
2001) seems to confirm this although examples from Paraguay (Carter and Galeano  1995)  and Guatemala
(Barham  et aL  1995)  suggest  that well-functioning  land markets  may, in some  situations,  also transfer
land  to  small  producers.  However,  most  of the  available  empirical  evidence  originates  from  Latin
America, a continent that is characterized by high inequality in access to land, a long history of distortions
in agricultural markets,  a tradition of weak property rights, and often significant entry barriers in the rural
non-farm sector (Reardon et al. 2001). Many of these conditions differ  narkedly  from East Asia and in
some  cases also  Africa  where,  with  some  exceptions,  land  ownership  is more  egalitarian,  population
density is often high, and with lower wages and higher rates of economic growth, opportunities to join the
off-farm sector are more plentiful.'
There is general agreement that expansion of the off-farm economy implies not only greater demands for
land markets but can also be affected by the scope for such markets to function (de Janvry et al. 2001),
empirical  analysis of the factors  underlying the performance of land sales  and rental markets  as well as
their impact would be of considerable interest.  Two key elements  would be the extent to which markets
contribute  to  equity,  i.e.  provide  land  access  to  the  poor,  their  contribution  to  greater  productive
efficiency,  and the existence of potential  trade-offs between these two goals.  Concerning productivity of
land use, data limitations have in the past often prevented studies from making clear inferences.
In view of the fact that with development of the off-farm economy, the scope  for productivity-enhancing
land transfers,  and thus the losses  associated with administrative  prohibition or malfunctioning  of such
markets,  are likely  to increase  significantly,  the lack of empirical  evidence on the  level of activity and
productivity impact of land markets  is of great  policy relevance.  In this paper,  we address both of these
issues by providing evidence on the functioning of land rental and sales markets separately and by using a
measure of households'  productive efficiency  for the case of Vietnam,  one of the few transition countries
where, even though land ownership remains with the state, both short term rental and permanent transfers
of use rights are  allowed. Conceptually,  and in line with the literature,  we assume  that land markets are
driven by three  factors, households'  agricultural  ability which is unobserved;  labor market  imperfections
in  the  form  of  supervision  constraints;  and  capital  market  imperfections.  (Deininger  et  al. 2002).
Empirically,  a  large  and  nationally  representative  panel  data set  is  used to  illustrate  the  evolution  of
markets  over time and derive a proper measure  of producers'  ability that can be used to make inferences
on the productivity impact of land markets.
' Many  of these  characteristics  also  apply  to  the  African  countri4s  mentioned  earlier,  although population  density is of course  very  low  in
Mozarmbique, in  contrast to Ethiopia.
2The paper  is structured  as  follows:  Section  two provides  background  on Vietnamese  land policy,  the
conceptual  framework and the econometric  approach.  Section three descnbes the data used and summary
statistics on socio-economic  characteristics  and land market participation  by sample households.  Section
four  discusses  the  econometric  evidence  on demand  and  supply  of land  in sales  and  rental  markets,
respectively.  Section five concludes.
2. Background  and conceptual framework
We  set  the  scene  by describing  recent  land  policy  initiatives  in  Vietnam  and,  based  on  a  general
discussion of land and other factor markets  in developing countries, present the conceptual model and the
estimation strategy underlying  our empirical  analysis. Conceptually, we note that imperfections  in labor
and  capital  markets  can  give  rise  to  sub-optimal  outcomes  in  land  markets  and  discuss  some  of the
empirical  evidence  with respect  to  land rental  and  sales  markets,  respectively.  The  conceptual  model
identifies ability, off-farm development, and government policies as key elements affecting functioning of
rental  markets  and  discusses  how  initial  wealth,  incidence  of shocks,  and access  to credit  will modify
these in the case of land sales markets so as to derive empirically testable hypotheses.
2.1 Land policy in Vietnam
From  1981,  Vietnam  started  to transform  its rural  sector from collectivized  agricultural  production  to a
system  based  on households'  initiative,  a move  that culminated  in the passage  of the  1988 Land  Law
(World Bank 2000).  Studies have shown that this led to significant increases  in overall rural productivity,
although pre-existing differences  between North and  South were not eliminated (Pingali and Xuan  1992,
Tran  1998).  After  1988,  further policy reforms were  initiated to increase  security of land use rights and
liberalize  inputs and outputs  markets.  A new law was enacted  in July  1993  to deal with  factors such as
threats of administrative  reallocation,  short duration of use rights, lack of transferability  and the inability
to  use  land  as collateral,  all  of which  were  perceived  to  discourage  investment  and  preclude  further
development of land  markets.  This law  establishes  the right to inherit,  transfer,  sell,  lease  or mortgage
land use (though not ownership)  rights and to receive compensation in case of expropriation. The new law
also extended the duration of land use rights to 20 years for annual  50 years  for perennial  crops.  All of
these reforms  together have greatly increased the transferability  of land rights, providing a near-ideal case
to compare in practice the functioning of sales and rental markets.
The literature  suggests  that these reforms have not only  increased efficiency  but also had considerable
equity benefits  (Ravallion and  van de Walle 2001). Higher levels of issuance  of land-use certificates  to
indicate  more secure land rights  have been  found to be associated,  at the community  level,  with higher
levels in the share of total area devoted  to perennials and some increase  in irrigation investment (Do and
3Iyer 2002).2 It has helped Vietnam  to achieve  tremendous increases  in output  and to not only transform
itself from a net importer of rice to the world's second largest exporter (Tran  1998) but also to increase its
share in a number of agricultural  export markets,  nalding it one of the fastest growing  economies in the
world during the  1990s. With a fairly egalitarian  land distribution such growth was translated into broad
poverty reduction;  the poverty headcount  dropped from 58% in  1992-1993  to 37% in  1997-1998  (Phong
and Glewwe 2002).
2.2 Land and other factor markets In rural areas of developing countries
To motivate the separate treatment of land sales and rental markets, we discuss key imperfections in labor
and  capital  markets  that  affect  the behavior  of  such  narkets.  We  note  that,  as  a result  of high risk,
imperfect  markets  for  credit  and  insurance,  limited  ability  to  use  land  as  a collateral  to  obtain  credit
financing, and non-agricultural  demand  for land,  agricultural sales markets may indeed encourage transfer
of land towards uses that may not always be socially optimal. At the same time, even in situations where
this is the case, informal exchange  or fornal land rental can do much to facilitate temporary land transfers
that can significantly  increase productive  efficiency and equity. Temporary, possibly informal, exchanges
of land offer greater flexibility but are also less affected by market imperfections than sales markets. Land
transfers,  between producers and across generations,  are likely to become of greater importance  as, with
development of the rural  economy,  greater opportunities  for off-farrn employment  emerge,  a conjecture
supported  by the  important  role  of land  rental  in many  developing  as  well  as developed  countries  (de
Janvry et al. 2001).
In  fact,  in a  world of perfect information and complete markets,  with zero  transaction costs and constant
returns  to  scale  for  agricultural  production,  the  ownership  distribution  of land  ownership  will  affect
households' welfare but will not matter for efficiency  outcomes, as all producers will adjust to operate  an
"optimum" farm size through temporary transactions in land or labor markets (Feder  1985).  Inperfections
in rural labor  markets are mainly due to the cost of supervision which arises  from the  fact that, except in
very limited circumstances,  a wage workers'  true effort  is not easily observable. This implies that wage
workers  will  have  limited  incentives  to exert  effort  and  either  need  to  be  supervised  at a  cost3 or be
offered contracts that provide higher incentives.  Family members have higher incentives to provide  effort
than hired labor, implying  that it would be advantageous  for those  who do not have enough land to fully
utilize their family labor endowment to rent in land or for those who are relatively  land abundant to rent
out, rather  than  engaging  in labor market transactions  that incur supervision  costs.  A number of studies
have  confirmed a negative  farm-size  productivity  relationship  for all but the smallest  farm size  classes
2 Refonn of property rights and incentives has  been credited  with a key role in overall growth not only in a  static but also a  dynamic sense (Che et
al. 2001).
3 In agricultural production, supervision  is particularly difficult or costly due  to the spatial dispersion of the production process  and the vagaries
of nature imply a  need  to constantly adjust to mnicrovariations of the natural environment.
4(Berry  and  Cline  1979,  Carter  1984, Newell  et al.  1997,  Kutcher and  Scandizzo  1981,  Burgess 2001,
Udry  1997),  or have not been able  to reject  the hypothesis  of constant returns to scale  in agricultural
production  (Lanjouw  1995,  Feder and et al.  1992, Wan  and Cheng  2001,  Olinto  1995).  Labor market
imperfections  would tend to transfer land from large producers who would have to rely on wage labor to
"poor  but  efficient"  small  producers  whose  family  labor  is  not  fully  utilized  by  cultivating  their
endowment.  Differences across households in (unobservable) agricultural  ability would add an additional
dimension but not alter the basic relationship.
Credit market imperfections  can, however, offset or even eliminate supervision cost advantages of family
farmers. For example,  if there  is a need for up-front working capital (e.g. to acquire inputs in addition to
land and labor) and credit markets do not function well so that access to capital depends on initial wealth,
the optimal  size  of the  operational  land holding would  vary systematically  with the size  of land owned
even if land rental markets were to operate perfectly. This will give rise to a positive relationship between
farm size and productivity, as is indeed confirmed by studies from environments  where credit markets are
important, e.g. Sudan (Kevane  1996) or in Malawi (Dorward 1999).
The relative importance of credit market imperfections varies, however, systematically between rental and
sales markets.  In rental markets,  share contracts provide scope for overcoming capital market imperfections
at relatively low cost (Basu  1992, Otsuka et aL  1992,  Ghatak and Pandey  2000, Ray and Singh 2001)  and
the  prevalence  of  share  contracts  in  many  regions  around  the  world  provides  evidence  that  the
circumstances under which it is a second  best solution are rather common.  In fact, systematic  variation of
contract  parameters  depending  on tenants'  wealth provides empirical  confirmation  for this (Quibria and
Rashid  1986,  Shetty  1988,  Shaban  1991,  Laffont  and  Matoussi  1995).  Many  studies  support  the
hypothesis  that share  tenancy provides  a second best arrangement  which, in any given environment,  is
difficult to  improve upon unless overall  circumstances  change  so that  the operation  of factor and credit
markets improves (Otsuka et al. 1992, Sharma and Dreze  1996, Sadoulet et al. 1994, Lansink et al. 2002,
Quisumbing  2001, Otsuka  2002). We  therefore  hypothesize that,  while credit market imperfections  will
affect the nature of contracts adopted, it will not undermine  the tendency of rental markets to transfer land
to more productive producers.
Contrary  to rental  markets,  sales market  outcomes  will be affected  by credit market  imperfections  and
other factors in a number of ways. First, where agricultural production is very risky and  insurance is not
available, farmers  may be forced to sell land off at low prices in distress sales  (Cain 1981, Bidinger et al.
1991,  Kranton  and  Swamy  1999).  Covariance  of land  prices may  imply  that  they  will be  unable  to
replenish their asset portfolio later (Zimmerman and Carter  1999, Binswanger  et al. 1995). Also,  to the
extent that land is valued  as an asset,  in addition to its use as an input into agricultural production,  non-
agricultural  land  demand,  (tax and  subsidy)  policies,  and  macro-economic  conditions  can  increase  land
5values over and above the present value of profits from agricultural  production  for specific groups but not
for others (Robison et al.  1985, Brandao and Rezende  1992, Gunjal et al. 1996), maldng it more difficult for
productive farmers to acquire land. Lack of long-term  credit can further exacerbate  the ability of small and
productive  farmers  to  acquire  land  through  the  sales  market.  Land sales  markets  would be even more
constrained  from  transferring  land  to producers  based solely on considerations  of productivity  in cases
where absence of long-term finance makes it more difficult for the latter to finance such acquisition.  All
of this leads us to expect that rental markets  will be more able than sales markets to transfer land to more
productive  producers.  We therefore  expect  sales  and rental  markets to  have  quite  different  outcomes,
although the extent to which more productive producers will have access to greater amounts of land and
to which credit market imperfections  will affect market outcomes remains an empirical question.
2.3 Conceptual model
To formalize  this, we first consider  land rental  markets and then add some of the additional  factors that
have to be taken into account for land sales. Let household i be endowed with fixed amounts of  labor (L,)
and land (Ai),  and a given level of agricultural ability (a,). Relative  land abundance is assumed  to make
farming  based  on  hired  labor  infeasible  and  households  can  allocate  their  labor  endowment  between
farming their own land and off-farm employment at an exogenous wage (w,). Renting  incurs transaction
costs  (7)  proportional  to  the  amount  of land transferred  and  we  assume  that  working  capital  is  not
binding. With this, household i will choose P', 1° 0as well as A  * by solving the maximization problem:
la,  Apa;f(l;a  ,A;) +wlio  - Ih  (Ai  ;1j)(r  +T) +Iou'(;!  - A )(r  T)  )
where p is the price of agricultural  goods, P is the amount of time allocated to off-farm labor (= L, - I,a ,
I"' is an indicator for rent-in  (=1  for rent-in, and 0 otherwise),  similarly  IP'  is an indicator for rent-out
(=1  for rent-out, and 0 otherwise), and all other variables in (a) are as defined above. The optimal choices
of i;a, ijt  and A;  will solve the first order conditions (FOC) of problem (P), i.e.
pa 1f,, (I  , Ai)  = w  (1)
plus, for households who rent in,  pa,fA (li°,  A,)  = r + T  (2)
or for households who rent out,  paJf,  (l1a,  Ai)  = r - T  (2)'
and for autarkic households,  r - T < pa,f4 (i; , Ai)  < r + T  (2)"
6The first order conditions  allow to derive three empirically  testable propositions  (see the appendix for a
more detailed derivation) as follows:
Proposition 1. The amount of land rented in is strictly increasing  in ability,  c, and strictly decreasing  in
their land endowment  A . Rental markets will thus transfer land to "poor but efficient" producers.
Proposition  2. Transaction  costs drive  a wedge  between  those renting in and  those renting out with any
increase  in  T decreasing  a, and increasing  a,, thereby  expanding the range of producers who remain in
autarky, reducing the number of households  who participate  in rental markets, as well  as the amount of
land transacted through rental markets. Reduction in transaction cost will increase social welfare.
Proposition  3. Increases of the wage for off-farm employment will increase the amount of land transacted
in rental markets and overall welfare. This will be associated with a decrease in the equilibrium rental rate
and, in a risk-free environment, will make everybody better off.
As discussed in more detail below, we use an estimate of producers'  agricultural ability to test proposition
one;  the  level  to  which  long-term  and  secure  land  rights  are  available  at  the  community  level,  for
proposition two;  and the level of off-farm  development  at the village  level as well  as households'  non-
farm employment history for proposition three.
For  land sales markets,  we follow the literature  on inter-temporal  asset accumulation  which implies that
household  i's choice  of consumption,  land accumulation  and saving each period together  solve  life time
utility maximization:
T-1
Max  V = E, E (1I+ f)-k  U(c,+)  (3)
k=O
Subject to  Ct+k  + (At+k  - A,+k-,  )Pt+k + (St+k  - St+ko-  ) ￿  Y,.k (A,+k)  (3a)
and  A.+*  2 0  (3b)
where  U(c,  ) is one period utility function,  c, is the level of consumption,  6is the rate of time preference,
A, is amount of land owned  in time  t, S, is amount of saving in time t,  Y,  (A,)  is the amount of income
household  i generate  in  time  t which  itself is  a  function  of the  land household  i owns  in  that period
(assume  household  self-cultivates  all  the  land  endowment).  (3b)  is  a  form  of borrowing  constraints,
restricting the end stock of tradable  assets to be nonnegative in each period.
If income  is  stochastic,  an analytical  solution  to this problem  can not be derived  (Zeldes  1989)  and the
literature  has resorted to simulation to obtain solutions under general assumptions  (Deaton  1991,  Zeldes
1989, Rosenzweig  and Wolpin  1993, Carter and Zimmerman  2000). We note that if land rights are secure
7in the long term and (long-term) rental as well as credit markets function well (allowing, in particular, the
use of future rental income  as a collateral), no land sales markets would be needed  as all the outcomes
from such markets could be accomnplished by long-term rentals. With secure land rights but credit market
imperfections,  the  only  reason  to  sell  land  would  be  as  response  to  a  shock that  threatens  to push
consumption  below  the  minimum needed  for survival.  We  would  therefore  predict  that land  sales,  as
compared to rentals, would be undertaken  only by households  who experienced  critical shocks  and who
are unable to borrow against their land because the financial infrastructure is incomplete.  Purchase of land
will, in such an environment, require higher levels of wealth or access to credit markets. Thus, whether or
not a household  experience  shocks,  as well as credit market access and initial wealth are thus variables
that are unlikely to affect rental markets but would be predicted to have a significant impact on land sales
and purchases.
2.4 Estmation strategy
To  obtain  an  estimate  of households'  agricultural  ability,  we  use  the  fact  that  we  have  a  panel  of
households  to estimate a production function with household fixed effects. Let technology  be represented
by the Cobb-Douglas production function
QU,  = exp(a,  aj  )A(, 1
9 LU,,  K&83  (4)
where Qv  is agricultural output produced by household i in village j in year t; AVb  Lu, and K,f  are the land,
labor and capital used to produce this output Q, with technical coefficients  0,, 02, and  60,  and exp(  aj).  is
the efficiency parameter which consists of a household-and  a village-specific  element reflecting  access to
infrastructure and mnarkets,  soil quality, climate, etc. Taking logs of both sides of equation (1) and adding
a time trend and an iid error term, and letting  a  = a  we obtain an estimable  equation for production
by household i in villagej at time t as follows.
qu, = au + Olay,  +  66 lut + 6B3  kg, + ot + e,),  (5)
where lower case letters refer to the logarithm of the quantities referred  to above.  Availability of multiple
observations per household in the panel allows us to estimate this equation using household fixed effects.
qVt- ivy  = oi,-  ,  +  6(Zu,-ZV)  + o(t-t)  +  *j  (6'
where Z^, is a vector consisting of a, l, k and 8 is a coefficiem  vector.  In addition to land4 and household
composition  to proxy  for  labor  use,5 Z,  includes  chemical  fertilizer,  organic  manure,  pesticides,  and
seeds. Fixed capital is the value of all assets related to crop production.  As no values were given for draft
4  To control  for land quality,  we include the share of irrigated land in  total crop land in the regression.
5  Unfortunately,  the survey does  not provide  detailed infornation  on  labor use  in agricultural  production, forcing  us to use family  composition
instead.
Sanimals, we include  a dummy indicating whether the household owned  a draft animal or not. Estimation
of equation (6)  allows us to recover the composite  efficiency parameter %4.  As this variable  still includes
unobservable characteristics  at the village level, we apply a similar procedure at the  village level to obtain
cs  the  subtraction  of which  from  aV provides  an  esfimate  ofc,  the pure  idiosyncratic  effect  for each
producer in the sample.
As discussed earlier, a household's decision to enter land rental markets depends on its agricultural ability,
the  size  of its  land  endowment,  the off-farm  opportunities  available,  and  the  size of transaction  costs
associated with  market participation.  Given that the incidence  of land mnarket  activity  in  1993  was  still
very limited, and not all  of the right hand  side variables  were available  for the first period,  we estimate
rental  and  sales  market  participation  for  the  1998  cross  section.  Formally  we  estimate  the  following
equation  for rental market participation using probit and tobit models for either a participation dummy or
area rented
R, = Po +  ,a  +  2 A,  + P3X, ++fi 5 C 1 +/36T, + ,5,  +  e  (7)
where  Ri is a dummy  for participation  in rental or markets or the area rented in or out, respectively,  or  is
agricultural  ability, derived  as described  above, A, is the household's per capita land endowment, Xi is a
vector of household  characteristics  including age,  sex, the head's education, other asset endowments,  and
initial  per capita expenditure  to proxy for poverty.  Two other household-specific  vectors or variables, 0,
and S,,  indicate  whether the household  had past off-farm  or migration  experience  and the level of local
off-farm  development  (0)  and  whether  the  household  experienced  one  or  more shocks  in  the  5-year
period  preceding  the survey  (SI).  Finally,  T, denotes  the  share  of producers  (excluding  the  one  under
concern)  who have been awarded written long-term use rights to proxy for lower transaction  costs of land
market participation.  To approximate the ability to access  credit markets,  C, indicates the share of other
producers  in  the  village  who  reported  having  access  to  formal  credit,  a  measure  that  is  similarly
constructed as T,.
The prediction  that land  (rental)  markets  would transfer land to  more productive  producers  with lower
endowments (proposition  one) leads us to expect that  6,,> 0 and /2  < O  in the equation for renting in and
opposite  signs in  the  equation  for renting  out.  While  a  positive  or negative  sign for renting  in or out,
respectively,  on the element of  33 corresponding to agricultural  assets would point towards  imperfections
in markets for these assets, the sign on other assets in the rental equation  is indeterminate a priori.  From
proposition two, we expect that /36 be positive both in the renting in and the renting out equations, i.e. that
better definition of property rights over land will increase  both supply to rental markets and demand  for
such transfers. At the same time, we expect ,/7,  the coefficient on whether or not a household experienced
a shock, to be insignificant  and do not have a  strong prior regarding  credit access.  Based on proposition
9three,  we  expect  households  whose  past  experience  in  off-farm  labor  markets  reflects  greater
opportunities for such employment  to be less likely to rent in and more likely to rent out and the level of
rental market activity in general to increase with development of the off-farm economy in a community as
measured by the share of income  derived from non-agricultural  sources.
The equation to be estimated for participation  in land sales markets is similar,  with the only difference
being that the  dependent  variable  now refers  to land purchases  during the 5-year  period preceding  the
survey and that a number of the dependent variables refer to initial conditions rather than, as in the case of
rental markets, contemporaneous ones. Formally, we estimate
Pi =  o + ,,ai  + 2 Ai + f 3Xi +fl4O, +f 5C, +  6Ti + PA + ASIC  +  e1 (7)
where Pi is a dummy for participation in sale or purchase markets or the area involved, respectively, a, is
agricultural  ability, Ai is the household's initial (1993) per capita land endowment, Xi is a vector of initial
household  characteristics  including  age,  sex,  the  head's education,  initial  asset endowment,  and  initial
consumption.  The remaining variables,  0,, Si, T,  and C,  are defined as above and the only difference  is that
we  add  a  interaction  between  Si and  Cl.  The  rationale  for  doing  so  is  that,  as  discussed  above,  in
environments  where  credit markets do not function well, distress sales  could be a main source of supply
of land to the sales market, something that can be tested by including this interaction.
Recall  from our earlier discussion that we expect that initial wealth is more important as a determinant of
land purchases than rentals. Second,  even though we would  expect households'  ability to increase  their
demand  for  cultivable  land,  the variable  would be less  important  in  sales markets.  Thus,  although  we
would  still  expect  ,B> 0 and  f13  <  0 in  the purchase  equation  and  opposite  in the  sales  equation,  the
magnitude and significance of the coefficients is expected to be lower in the latter where we also expect
agricultural  assets  to be of greater  importance. In addition to continuing  importance  of both transaction
costs and off-farm labor market opportunities, we also expect that permanent land transactions both credit
market access  and having experienced  a shocks in the past will be important.  With presence of financing
constraints,  we expect  availability  of credit to increase  households'  propensity  to purchase land.  At the
same time  shocks, especially  in  environments  where  credit markets  are thin,  may force households to
undertake distress sales, thus having a positive impact on land sales but not on land purchases.
3. 1Data sources and descriptive evidence
Before discussing  econometric results, we highlight some salient features of Vietnam's rural economy by
presenting  evidence  on socio-economic  characteristics  and  changes  in  land  market  participation  over
time.  The  data illustrate  the  considerable  reduction  of poverty  achieved  through  high levels of recent
economic  growth  and  off-farm  development  but also  a point  towards  considerable,  though regionally
differentiated,  increase in land market activity.
I03.1. Socio-economic  characteristics
The  data used in the  analysis come  from the  1992/93  and  1998  rounds of Vietnam's Living Standards
Surveys (VLSS)  which included 4,800 and 6,000 households, respectively.  The survey was conducted by
Vietnam's General Statistical Office and the sample stratified into 7 administrative  areas which we group
into four major regions.  Our analysis  focuses on the 2825  households  included in the rural panel of the
VLSS who were interviewed  in both 1992/3 and 1998.  Table I reports descriptive  statistics for the whole
country  in  1993  and  1998  and  the  four  main  regions  in  1998.6  We  note  that  the  size  of an  average
household  ranged from 4 to 5 persons, about 3 in the  14 to 60 age category and 0.5 above  60, and the age
of household heads about 44 in 1993. About 20% of  households, ranging from 17% to 30% depending on
the region, were headed by a female. Levels of formal education increased considerably,  from 4 years in
1993  to  6.8  years  in  1998.  About  10% of households  experienced  loss  of one  or  more  adult  family
members during the 1993 to 1997 period.!
Survey results point towards an average annual increase of per capita expenditure of 5.9% over the 1993-
1998 period,  from  1.69 Mn. Dong to 2.26 Mn.  Dong. While per capita income in 1998 is almost equal to
per capita expenditure,  the large  gap between  the two in  1993 is likely to be attributable to measurement
error,  i.e.  underreporting  of income  in the  first  period.  Despite  this  increase,  and  a  highly egalitarian
distribution  of per  capita  expenditure,  which  is  characterized  by a  Gini  coefficient  of 0.26,  the rural
economy is still quite  poor, with per capita  income  amounting  to between  US$153.46  (in the Northern
Uplands) to US$ 245.45 (in the South).
The rapid pace of off-farm development  is illustrated by the marked  increase  in migration visible  in table
1.  While the share of household heads who had migration  experience increased from 11%  in 1993 to 15%
in  1998, the next generation seems to have benefited most from the increase in off-farm employment.  The
share  of households  who  had  at least  one  member  with  an  off-farm job  increased  from  30%  to 55%
between the two periods and the incidence of migration  by household members  accelerated  from 29% in
1993 to 64% in  1998. The level of migration  differs across regions, with only  56% of households  having
a migrating member in the Red River Delta and North Central,  as compared  to 75% in the Southeast and
Mekong  Delta. However,  the increase  in the share of households  who,  since 1993,  have had at least one
member migrate was fairly uniform  across the four regions, implying that the variation observed  is due to
pre-existing differences rather than a differential  evolution (and  a failure of some regions  to benefit from
off-farm employment).
6 In the  descriptive table  and  also for all  the econometric  regressions, we  divide the 2824  households  into 4 regions  based  on  the original 7
administrative  regions.  Regionl  include  the  546  households  from  Northem  Uplands  administrative  region.  Region  2  includes  the  1326
households from  Red River Delta and North Central.  Region 3 includes  the 298 households from original Central  Coast region. Finally Region 4
includes the 650 households from Southeast region and Mekong River Delta region.
7 We  focus on  adults, defined as being above the age of 13 years,  because in these  cases, deaths  imply the loss of a significant amount of family
labor, the need to incur expenses for burials, and possibly also the necessity of  distnbuting land holdings among heirs. Any of these will seriously
reduce  the household's productive capacity.
IIThe high  level of non-farm  activity notwithstanding,  agriculture  and crop  production remain the main
sources of income for rural households even though their share has decreased from 83% to 78% or 70% to
66% for agricultural and crop income,  respectively.  This implies that the level of endowments,  as well as
the scope  for exchanging  land endowments  through formal  and informal  means,  continue  to be of great
importance for overall  livelihood. In this context, we note that per capita land endowments remain small
(0.3 ha of annual and 0.06 ha of perennial  crops on average),  though somewhat variable  across regions.
They  are largest in the South where  the per capita endowment  is more than I ha (0.85  ha of annuals and
0,23 ha of perennials) and smallest in the Red River Delta (0.26 ha of annuals and 0.02 ha of perennials).
We  also  note  that  land  was  quite  equitably  distributed,  with  a  Gini  coefficient  of per  capita  land
endowments  ranging  between  0.34  to  0.37  except  for  Southeast  &  Mekong  Delta  where  the  Gini
coefficient  is 0.51  as compared to 0.26 for per capita expenditure.  At the same time, we note that there
was no significant increase in land inequality during the period under concern; in fact the Gini coefficient
for per capita land endowments is estimated to have declined slightly, from 0.53 to 0.50.
Table  I also highlights  that there has been a large increase  in the  share of land held under long-term  use
rights, a share that increased  from 25%  in 1993  to 88%  in  1998. Given that in all the regions except the
South (where 65% of land were held  under long-term rights in  1993),  the share of land held under long
term use rights was one fifth or less of the total, this points towards a considerable admninistrative  effort at
documenting  and  increasing  the security  of land rights.8 The  inter-regional  variation  in broad levels of
development noted earlier is reflected in differences of overall asset endowments,  computed as the sum of
housing, enterprise,  and business assets (agricultural and non-agricultural but excluding land). In line with
what  is observed  in many  developing  countries, housing  constitutes rural households'  main asset while
enterprise  asset make  up only between 6% and  13%  of the total. Asset endowments  are highest in the
South.  Our data also indicate  that access  to formal  credit remains  limited;  while the share of producers
reporting  to  have had access  to such  credit increased  from  9%  to  21%  between  1993  and  1998, being
above one third of the total in the South and Central Coast but relatively low in other regions.9
3.2 Lamd market partcicpation
Descriptive evidence 'on land market participation in both periods as reported in Table 2 points towards a
rapid  increase in land transactions, together  with considerable  differences  across regions. Rental  market
participation  more than  quadrupled  from  3.8%  in  1993  to  15.8%  in  1998.  Interestingly,  within  rental
markets,  the lion's share of land, almost half in each period, is obtained for free (1.7%  in 1993  and 7.2%
in  1998),  followed by  fixed rent (1.7%  and  6.2%, respectively)  and  sharecropping  arrangements  (0.4%
a  Although  the region-wise, about 88 percent of annual land ame  entitled with long-tern  use,  but village-wise, some 20 percent villages (21  out of
220) only have less than 60 percent of  annual land within village are entitled with long-term land use.
9  Note that in the regressions reported below we use the share of households in a given villaSe (excluding the household under concern) who have
access to credit as the right hand side variable to avoid endogeneity.
12and 2.4%).  While the share of households  who report to have transferred out land  is, with 0.8%  in 1993
and 5.8%  in  1998,  much  lower,  probably  due  to  the fact that  some of the  absentee  landlords  are  not
accounted  for, it illustrates a similarly strong increase in overall rental market activity.
The  increase  in  land  sales transactions  was  even more pronounced,  from a mere  1% of producers who
bought land in the 5-year period prior to the survey in 1993 to 7.2% (equivalent  to an annual turnover of
almost  1.5%)  in  1998.  Descriptive  data  also  point  towards  marked  differences,  both  in  overall
participation  and  in  the  relative  weight of different  modalities  of land  transfer,  across  regions.  Even
though  rental  is  quantitatively  more  important  than  sales  everywhere,  the  share  of producers  who
purchased  land is high in the Northern Uplands  and the South and Mekong Delta, although purchases  are
virtually  non-existent  in the  Central  Coast.  Also,  in all cases,  fixed  rent  is more  important  than  share
cropping but in all regions except  the Central  Coast and  the  South,  free informal  transfers of land are
more important than cash rental. Clearly, econometric  analysis of the factors underlying these outcomes,
as well as their likely impact, will be of great interest.
4. Econometric evidence
We  report  results  from  rental  and sales  equations  separately  and refer  to  the  appendix  for production
function estimation  used to  derive households'  agricultural  ability.  The key  finding  is that demand  for
renting  in and purchase  is driven  by higher  levels  of productivity and  lower  land  endowments.  At the
same time, and as predicted,  more secure land rights reduce transaction costs and help activate rental and
sales markets. Access to credit and asset endowments are important mainly for land purchases but not for
renting in. Regarding  supply to rental markets,  off-farm experience and non-agricultural  assets emerge  as
key variables  in the renting out equation where the land endowment is of marginal significance and ability
is  insignificant.  In  the  sales  equation,  land  endowments  and  productivity  are  significant  and  of the
predicted  sign. Furthermore,  we find that being affected by a shock, and  credit access,  has a significant
impact on land sales markets.
4.1.  Land rental markets
Table  3 presents  results  for rental  market  participation,  both on the  demand  and the  supply  side.  The
positive  and  statistically  significant  coefficients  of agricultural  ability  in  the  basic  models  of rent-in
participation  equation  (columns  I and 3 of table 3) indicates that rentals transfer land to households  with
high  level of agricultural  ability.  To illustrate,  the most efficient producer  in the sample  (c=3.28) has a
more than 20% higher probability of obtaining additional  land through rental than the least efficient (a-
2.29), other things constant. This suggests that, as expected,  land rental markets indeed transfer resources
to those producers who are able to make more productive use of them.
13In  addition  to  the positive  impact  on efficiency,  we  also note that land  rental markets  have  a positive
impact on equity by transferring  land to those with more limited endowments.  This is illustrated  by the
fact  that the coefficient  on land endowment is negative and highly  significant; in line with the negative,
though  insignificant,  coefficient  on  initial  per  capita  expenditure.  At  the  same  time,  the  positive
coefficient  on possession of draft animals, together with the marginally  significant on agricultural  assets
(at  10%)  point  towards  some  imperfections  in  markets  for animals  and  capital  equipment.  However,
noting  that  the  coefficient  on total  (non-land)  assets  is insignificant  allows  us to conclude  that rental
markets have a positive overall impact on equity. This is reinforced by the fact that the regression leads us
to  reject  the  hypothesis  that  female-headed  households  were  disadvantaged  in  access  to  land  rental
opportunities  and  that those  who experienced  a  shock  were  not more  likely  to engage  in  land rental
activity.
We  also  note  that rental  markets  tend  to  transfer  land  to  producers  in the  most  productive  age;  the
tendency to rent in land increases,  though only weakly,  up to a maximum of 48 years. Households  with
access to remittances are slightly less likely to rent in land, although the coefficient is significant only at
10%. Village level variables  illustrate that higher security of tenure in the form of land use certificates  is
highly significant  in increasing the  demand  for renting  in. Having all  the land in the village under long-
term use rights is estimated to increase the propensity to rent in land by almost 12 percentage points, thus
highlighting the need for a minimum level of tenure security  as one of the institutional pre-conditions for
rental markets to emerge.  However, rental activity is higher rather than lower in villages that depend more
heavily on agriculture,  as proxied by the mean share of income from agriculture.
As descriptive statistics  pointed towards  marked  differences  across regions,  we specify  a second model
where the level of ability is interacted  with regional dummies. Results, reported in column 2 of table 3,
confirm  that there are  significant differences  in the extent to which rental markets  contribute to  greater
productive  efficiency;  point estimates for the respective  parameter are  0.15 and 0.14 in regions  I and 3,
respectively, while being much smaller (0.03) in region 2 and insignificant in region 4. Other coefficients
are  not affected.  We note that the general conclusions are consistent  with evidence  from the tobit model
which  is available  upon request,  and will return to discuss the regionally differentiated  result for below,
jointly with the evidence  for sales markets.
On  the supply side to the rental market,  we find that the sign on ability is insignificant and the sign on
land endowments negative  and significant at the  10%  level, implying that neither low agricultural  ability
nor  large  land  endowments  provide  a  strong  motivation  for  households  to  rent  out land.  In  fact,  the
positive  and significant  signs on total assets,  past off farm experience,  and the  share of households  with
credit access  in the village all  suggest  that opportunities  for off-farm employment  are the driving  force
behind supply of land to the rental market, a notion that is supported by the negative and significant  sign
14of the coefficient  on agricultural  assets. The significant sign of long-term use rights (at 10%) implies that
better definition of land rights increases not only demand for land rental as seen earlier, but also serves to
augment  supply of land to the market.  Regional  disaggregation  of the efficiency parameter  supports the
conclusion  that low efficiency  is not a major reason  for households  to supply land to the rental market
while confirming  that greater involvement in off-farm activities,  smaller household  size, and better access
to credit at the village level, increase supply of land to rental markets..
4.2.  Land sales markets
Regression results for households'  participation  in land sales markets, parallel to the evidence for rental,
are reported  in table 4.  We note that  it is more productive  producers who have, during the last 5 years,
been able  to acquire land through land purchase. This, together  with the fact that larger households with
more  limited  initial  land  endowments  have  been  able  to  access  such  markets,  similar  to  what  was
observed  in rental  markets, suggests  that, in the case of Vietnam, credit market imperfections  have not
been strong enough to overcome efficiency advantages.'"
This  does  not imply  that  credit markets  would  be  irrelevant;  to the  contrary,  the  fact that  the  initial
endowment with assets,  but not the level of agricultural  assets, is highly  significant,  suggests that credit
market imperfections  affect demand  for land through sales but not through rental markets.  Interestingly,
the  share of households with access to credit  in the village  is highly  significant as well, lending  further
support  to the hypothesis  that activity  in land sales markets  will be more pronounced  if credit  markets
function well.
A further parallel to the land rental markets  is the high significance  of well-defined  land rights (i.e. long-
term use contracts)  as a determinant  of land sales market activity.  Regional disaggregation,  on the other
hand,  suggests  that more  efficient producers  access  land through rental  and  sales  markets  only  in the
Northern Uplands while sales markets  are the mechanism of choice in the South and rental markets  in the
Central  Coast.  While  the  longer  history  of private  land  rights  in  the  South  may  be  one  reason  for
households  preferring  sales rather than rental markets  to adjust,  further  study of this issue would be of
interest.
As one of the  principal  concerns against  land sales  markets is that unfettered operation of such  markets
would lead poor and marginal producers to part with their land, results from the land supply equation are
of particular  interest.  Contrary to our expectations,  the regressions (columns  3 and 4 of table 4) suggest
that less productive producers  with high levels of endowment and lower levels of agricultural assets tend
to sell their land. In fact, the positive and significant coefficient on initial per capita expenditure  and the
" This conclusion is  supported by the fact that the magnitude of  the coefficients for sales is  not significantly different from those in rental markets.
15lack  of significance  of asset  endowments  and other  wealth-indicators  suggests that  land sales  are not
concentrated among the poor.
At  the  same  time,  the  fact  that the  coefficient  on  the shock  variable  is  positive  and  significant  does
suggest that households  who are  affected by an unexpected shock in the form of death of a member may
have to resort to selling land as  an adjustment  strategy. In the augmented  model, the interaction between
having experienced  a shock and credit access at the village level is negative, suggesting that better access
to credit allows those hit by a shock to use credit markets, rather than land sales, to smooth consumption.
While more detailed investigation of the impact of deaths on households'  survival strategies as well as the
coping  strategies  open  to  them,  would  be  desirable,  our results  support  the  hypothesis  that,  unless
households have mechanisms other than land sales, in particular  credit markets,  to cope with shocks, one
can not exclude the scope for land sales markets to lead to undesirable outcomes.
5.  Conclusion  and poUlcy hIplcations
Our study was motivated by the fact that, even though many transition countries have taken far-reaching
measures  to  establish individual  land rights,  explicit  or implicit restrictions  on the  functioning  of land
markets remain widespread.  Such restrictions  are often motivated  by fears that unmitigated  operation of
land markets  may negatively  affect equity  and possibly efficiency  even  though the applicable  evidence
originates mainly from non-transition  countries with considerably different structural characteristics.  The
empirical  analysis for Vietnam, which builds on a framework where ability, the level of local non-farm
development,  and secure  land rights and other public  goods drive the operation of land rental and sales
and rental markets, allows us to contribute  to the literature in three respects:
First, we  find that both rental and sales markets have  an unambiguously positive impact on productivity
and  provide  opportunities  for  households  with  higher  levels  of ability  to  access  land.  Together  with
evidence  that these markets  have allowed  producers with smaller  (initial) endowments to gain access to
more land, this suggests that, in Vietnam, barriers preventing access to land markets are low. A relatively
egalitarian  land  ownership  distribution  and rapid  growth  of off-farm  opportunities  are  likely to partly
underlie this result.
Second,  we find that non-agricultural  development  is indeed a major factor in the development of land
rental  markets.  Off-farm  employment  is not only a key reason  for households  to supply  land to rental
markets;  the  increase  in  such  opportunities  during  the  last  5 years  can also  go  a  long way  towards
explaining the observed  surge in rental activity (from less than 4% in 1993 to almost  16%  in  1998). We
find no evidence to support the hypothesis  that credit market imperfections would lead poor but efficient
producers  to part with their land; to the contrary it is larger land owners with lower levels of agricultural
productivity who  are offering  land on the sales  market. At the  same time,  the fact that households  who
16recently experienced  a  shock are more likely to sell  land, especially  in environments  where credit access
is limited, implies that, unless other mechanisms  for consumption smoothing are available,  there remains
a danger of distress  sales that needs to be accounted for if designing policy interventions.
Finally, government policy has an important impact on land market operation in at least two respects.  On
the one  hand,  a  variable that  is consistently  significant  in all regressions of market  participation  is the
security of property rights.  This supports the hypothesis that provision of clear, enforceable,  and secure
long-term land rights, even if they may fall far short of full ownership rights, is an essential pre-condition
for the operation  of land  rental  and sales  markets.  On  the  other hand, access  to credit is  important to
prevent  distress sales by households who, without  such access,  would be unable  to smooth  consumption
in the face of adverse shocks.
These  findings are likely to be of relevance for other transition economies as well as for the study of the
functioning of land markets in more general terms. Regarding the first, the example of Vietnam illustrates
that, in transition economnies  where, because initial land endowments  were distributed  in an egalitarian
fashion  irrespective  of individual  ability,  the  scope  for  increasing  allocative  efficiency  and  household
welfare through adjustments  in operational holding  sizes is likely to be large. At the  same time, evidence
from  Eastern  European  transition  countries  suggests  that  failure  to  clarify  land  rights  or  to  make
households aware of their rights and enable them to enforce such rights at low cost has, in an environment
characterized  by the asymmetric  access  to  information,  capital, and  legal means of enforcement  that is
often typical of transition  economies,  led to land re-concentration  with undesirable  social and economic
consequences  (Csaki  et  al.  2002).  While  this  suggests  that  "premature"  introduction  of markets  in  a
context where land rights are not well-defined  or can not be enforced can have negative  consequences, the
example  of Vietnam  highlights  that  it is not the  functioning  of markets  per se but rather  the  broader
conditions  under which such markets operate which can give rise to undesirable outcomes. More research
on  the  necessary  pre-conditions,  in  terms  of land  rights  and  the  development  of other  markets,  for
efficiency-enhancing  land transfers  to take place  and the differential roles  performed by land rental  and
land sales markets in the context of transition economies  could improve understanding  and the ability  to
provide policy advice on this issue.
For the study of land markets  in general, our findings  imply that restrictions  on the functioning of land
rental which continue  to remain in place  in a number of countries are difficult  to justify.  Given that they
may  be  difficult  to  enforce  and  associated  with  considerable  losses  in  terms  of efficiency  as  well  as
equity,  it may be more desirable  for policy to try and harness potential of markets through  interventions
that  improve  the  framework  for  markets  to  operation.  At  the  same  time,  the  fact  that  absence  of
mechanisms  for  consumption  smoothing  may,  in the  presence  of shocks,  lead to  distress  sales  with
possibly undesirable  consequences,  suggests that more in-depth evidence on the interactions between land
17and credit markets and the long-term impact of land rental as compared to sales markets on (agricultural
and  non-agricultural)  investment,  household  welfare,  and productivity  in settings  with multiple market
imperfections will be of interest. Transition economies  such as Vietnum,  which, in addition to large inter-
regional variation, are also characterized by significant dynamics in land markets, could provide empirical
evidence  for such research which,  by including  an assessment of interactions between  land markets  and
non-agricultural  investments,  could generate insights on the role and contribution of land markets in the
broader context of  rural economic development.
l8Table 1.  Household  Cbarateristics
Sample  Sample  Red River Delta  Coastal  Southeast &
1993  1998  N Uplands  & North Center  Central  Mekong Delta
Basic household characterLstics
Size of household  5.12  4.86  5.23  4.42  5.04  5.34
Members younger than 14 years  2.00  1.64  1.97  1.51  1.69  1.62
Member  14-60 years old  2.74  2.78'  2.87  2.48  2.91  3.25
Members older than 60  0.38  0.43  0.39  0.43  0.45  0.47
Age of head  44.51  47.32  43.53  47.20  50.16  49.44
Education of head (years)  4.03  6.84  7.28  8.10  5.27  4.73
Female headed  20 0 %  21%  17%  22%  30%  21%
Lost one or more adult members  10.1%  9.8%  8.3%  14.4%  12.1%
Income and Its composition
Per capita expenditure (Mn Dong)  1993  1.69  1.39  1.61  1.80  2.08
Per capita expenditure (Mn Dong)  1998  2.26  1.77  2.29  2.28  2.58
Gini of per capita expenditure  0.263  0.258  0.234  0.251  0.244  0.256
Per capita income (Mn. Dong)  1.25  2.30  2.03  2.01  2.01  3.23
Share of income from agriculture  83%  78%  87%  75%  77%  77%
Share of income from crop production  70%  66%  70%  62%  62%  70%
Head with off-farm job experience  8%  12%  9%  14%  14%  8%
Head with migrationexperience  1993  11%  11%  11%  14%  9%
Head with migration experience  1998  15%  13%  16%  18%  15%
Family with off-flirm job experience  30%  55%  59%  48%  57%  64%
Family with migration experience  1993  29%  25%  23%  37%  43%
Family with migration experience  1998  64%  66%  56%  67%  75%
Share of remittances in income  2%  4%  2%  6%  5%  3%
Land endowment
Area of annual  land (m 2)  2983.16  4320.35  3801.10  2635.07  3522.40  8527.96
Area of perennial  land (ri2)  600.24  780.28  548.95  212.31  475.06  2261.79
Land with long term title 1993  25%  20%  9%  14%  65%
Land with long term title 1998  88%  91%  84%  97%  91%
Share of landless  4%  2%  0%  3%  0%  2%
Gini of the per capita land distribution  0.534  0.499  0.343  0.373  0.376  0.515
Asset endowments
Value of total assets (Mn.  Dong)  10.63  30.35  25.23  31.27  24.73  35.33
Share of house  76%  77%  79%  81%  63%  72%
Share of enterprise assets (agric.  & industry)  9%  8%  7°/O  6%  13%  9%
Households w fornal credit access  1993  9%  8%  10%  13%  8%
Households w formal credit access  1998  21%  10%  17%  35%  33%
Observations  2825  2825  546  1326  298  655
Source: Own computation  from 1998 VLSS
'The  average exchange rate between  US dollar and Vietnamese  Dong in 1997/1998 is USS  I  13091  Vietnamese  Dong
19Table 2: Land market partcIdpaton  In 1993 and 1998
Total Sample  N Uplands  Red River Delta  Coast Central  Southest &
a  North Central  Mekong Delta
1993
Rented in land  3.80%  7.20%  2.60%  1.30%  4.80%
Fixed rent  1.70%  2.40%  1.10%  0.30%  2.90%
Share cropping  0.40%  0.20%  0.50%  0.00%  0.80%
Free  1.70%  4.60%  1.00%  1.00%  1.100 %
Bought land  1.00%  0.70%  0.50%  0.00%  2.90%/o
Rented out land  0.53%  0.20%  0.60%  0.30%  0.80%
Fixed rent  0.20%  0.20%  0.20%  0.00%  0.30%
Share cropping  0.03%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.20%
Free  0.30%  0.00%  0.40%  0.30%  0.30%
Sold land  0.30%  0.40%  0.00%  0.00%  1.10%
1998
Rented  in land  15.80%  11.00%  22.70%  8.00%  9.40%
Fixed rent  6.20%  2.20%  7.90%  6.40%  6.10%
Share cropping  2.40%  2.00%  3.70%  0.30%  0.90%
Free  7.20%  6.80%  11.10%  1.30%  2.40%
Bought land  7.20%  9.50%  6.10%  0.70%  10.50%
Rented out land  4.10%  2.00%  5.30%  5.00%  3.70%
Fixed rent  1.20%  0.20%  1.40%  1.00%  2.10%
Share cropping  0.60%  0.20%  1.10%  0.00%  0.20%
Free  2.30%  1.60%  2.80%  4.00%  1.40%
Sold land  1.70%  2.00%  0.20%  0.00%  5.00%
Observations  2825  546  1326  298  655
20Table 3. Probit Results for Land Rental Market Partidipation
Renting In  Renting out
Basic Model  Augmeented Model  Basic Model  Augmented Model
Agriculturml ability  0.039***  0.003
(3.56)  (0.45)
Agriculutral ability*Regionl  0.142***  0.051 *
(3.22)  (1.77)
Agriculutral ability*Region2  0.034**  -0.017*
(2.32)  (1.66)
Agriculutral ability*Region3  0.153***  0.037*
(3.64)  (2.22)
Agriculutral  ability*Region4  0.002  0.012
(0.13)  (1.07)
P.c. land endowment (log)  -0.010***  -0.010***  -0.003*  -0.003*
(4.30)  (4.45)  (1.75)  (1.69)
Value of  agricultural assets  0.004*  0.004**  -0.003**  -0.003***
(1.83)  (2.06)  (2.57)  (2.73)
Value of total assets  -0.001  -0.002  0.003*0  0.003**
(0.47)  (0.83)  (2.15)  (2.01)
Draft animal  0.022**  0.022**  -0.011  -0.010
(2.18)  (2.43)  (1.62)  (1.51)
P. c. expenditure  1993 (log)  -0.009  -0.011  0.002  0.000
(1 09)  (1.44)  (0.23)  (0.06)
Log of household size  -0.003  -0.003  -0.0170*  -0.016*
(0.30)  (0.31)  (2.31)  (2.25)
Head's age (log)  1.010**  0.947***  -0.128  -0.103
(2.51)  (2.60)  (0.50)  (0.43)
Head's age squared  -0.135**  -0.126***  0.019  0.016
(2.56)  (2.65)  (0.57)  (0.50)
Head's education (log)  -0.029  -0.030  -0.016  -0.015
(0.98)  (1.12)  (0.75)  (0.75)
Head's education squared  0.015  0.015  0.014  0.015
(0.88)  (0.98)  (1.24)  (1.34)
Head with off-farm job  -0.004  -0.005  0.031 **  0.029***
experience  (0.35)  (0.45)  (2.92)  (2.90)
Head with past migration  0.012  0.013  -0.008  -0.006
experience  (0.92)  (1.06)  (0.90)  (0.74)
Female healed  0.007  0.008  0.003  0.003
(0.69)  (0.78)  (0.34)  (0.38)
Rernittances  received (log)  -0.003*  -0.002*  0.002*  0.002*
(1.78)  (1.75)  (1.71)  (1.73)
Households in village with  -0.005  -0.006  0.029**  0.026**
credit access  (0.25)  (0.34)  (2.19)  (2.01)
Village land w. long term use  0.118***  0.1040**  0.035*  0.034*
rights  (3.73)  (3.67)  (1.67)  (1.68)
ZemV6ziry migration durmmy  -0.013  -0.009  -0.012  -0.011
(village)  (0.83)  (0.61)  (1.36)  (1.34)
Main income from agriculture  0.048***  0.042***  -0.005  -0.005
(village)  (3.26)  (3.13)  (0.37)  (0.39)
Household  experienced shock  -0.005  -0.004  0.003  0.003
(0.42)  (0.34)  (0.34)  (0.30)
Observations  2824  2824  2824  2824
Log likelihood
Robust z  statistics in parentheses; * significant  at 10%;  * significant at 5%; '*  significant at 1%
21Table 4. Probit Results for Land Sale Market Particlpatlon
Land Purchases  Land Sales
Basic Model  Augmented Model  Basic Model  Augmented  Model
Agricultural ability  0.039*°  -0.00400
(3.67)  (2.34)
Agriculutal ability°Region I  0.094°°°  0.006
(3.30)  (0.94)
Agriculutral  ability°Region2  0.024  -0.006000
(1.24)  (2.74)
Agriculutral  ability°Region3  0.015  0.001
(0.66)  (0.65)
Agriculutral  ability°Region4  0.041°°  -0.0060°°
(2.20)  (2.87)
P. c. land endowment in 1993 (log)  -0.009°°°  -0.010°°°  0.005°°°  0.005°°°
(4.22)  (4.42)  (5.30)  (5.73)
Value of agricultural assets in 1993  -0.000  0.001  -0.0010  -0.0010
(0.26)  (0.74)  (1.86)  (1.88)
Value of total assets in 1993  0.004°°  0.005°°°  0.000  0.000
(2.24)  (2.62)  (0.78)  (0.74)
Draft animal in 1993  -0.002  -0.012  -0.006°°°  -0.0050°°
(0.26)  (1.24)  (3.19)  (3.34)
P. c. expenditure in 1993  0.005  0.008  0.00300  0.0020
(0.56)  (0.78)  (2.38)  (1.89)
Log of initial household  size  0.027°°  0.032°0  -0.001  -0.001
(2.39)  (2.56)  (0.25)  (0.46)
Log of age of household head  0.144  0.224  0.061  0.057
(0.41)  (0.57)  (1.03)  (1.15)
Log of head's age squared  -0.021  -0.032  -0.009  -0.008
(0.45)  (0.63)  (1.13)  (1.26)
Log of head's education  0.054  0.058  -0.001  -0.001
(1.50)  (1.44)  (0.20)  (0.16)
Log of head's education squared  -0.019  -0.023  0.001  0.001
(1.02)  (1.12)  (0.25)  (0.24)
Head with off-farm job experience  -0.007  -0.013  -0.003  -0.002
(0.64)  (1.10)  (1.29)  (1.36)
Head with past migration experience  0.008  0.008  0.002  0.001
(0.62)  (0.58)  (0.67)  (0.57)
Household headed by female  -0.019°  -0.023°°  0.000  0.000
(1.86)  (2.07)  (0.18)  (0.21)
Log of remittances received  -0.002  -0.003°  -0.000  -0.000
(1.53)  (1.74)  (1.09)  (1.20)
Share of households in village with  0.0540°0  0.058°°°  -0.002  -0.002
credit access  (3.53)  (3.21)  (0.61)  (0.79)
Share of land in village titled with long  0.049°00  0.050°°  0.0220  0.0210°
term use  (2.64)  (2.38)  (1.96)  (1.87)
Dummy of village with common  0.010  0.013  0.003  0.003
temporarily  migration  (0.87)  (0.99)  (1.27)  (1.39)
Dummy of village with main income  0.04200  0.049000
from agriculture  (2.38)  (2.59)
Dummy of households with adult family  0.006  0.006  0.008°0  0.0070°
members die-  (0.50)  (0.45)  (2.17)  (2.28)
Interaction  of shock and credit access  -0.019  -0.0180
(1.39)  (1.71)
Observations  2824  2824  2824  2824
Log likelihood
Robust z statistics in parentheses;  0 significant at 10%;  00 significant at 5%;  000  significant at 1%
22Appendix Table 1. Fixed Effect Panel Estimation of Crop Production Function
Household fixed  Household Fixed  Village Fixed  Village Fixed
Effect (1)  Effect (2)  Effect (I)  Effect (2)
Logoftotal seed application  0.018***  0.018***  0.012**  0.013***
(4.43)  (4.41)  (4.00)  (4.17)
Log of total pesticide use  0.004**  0.004**  0.005*'*  0.005***
(2.11)  (2.20)  (2.78)  (2.76)
Log of  total organic manure use  0.011  0.011  ***  0.0140**  0.014**
(5.75)  (5.75)  (9.86)  (9.76)
Log of total fertilizer use  0.025***  0.025***  0.028***  0.028***
(6.94)  (6.86)  (10.40)  (10.51)
Log of total  crop area  0.722***  0.722***  0.763***  0.757***
(52.09)  (52.12)  (80.89)  (79.78)
Log of household head's age  0.059  0.040  0.016  -0.006
(1.33)  (0.94)  (0.73)  (0.32)
Log of household size  0.001  0.093**
(0.05)  (6.74)
Log of no. of household member with age less  0.001  0.004*6
than 14  (0.40)  (2.39)
Log of  no. of  household member with age  0.001  0.012***
between  14 and 60  (0.12)  (3.77)
Log of no. of  household member with age  .0.006**  0.001
greater than 60  (2.08)  (0.48)
Uog of total agricultural  assets  0.004***  0.003***  0.010***  0.009**
F135  (2.74)  (2.63)  (10.10)  (9.73)
Share of irrigated area in total crop area  0.096**  0.096***  0.039**  0.039**
(4.40)  (4.36)  (2.02)  (2.05)
nunmmy  of draft animal  0.037  0.038  0.050***  0.046***
(1.53)  (1.58)  (3.36)  (3.06)
Year==98  0.358***  0.358***  0.365**  0.364**
(30.60)  (30.56)  (31.39)  (31.40)
Observations  6160  6160  6160  6160
R-squared  0.68  0.68  0.77  0.77
,Robust  z statistics in parentheses;  * significant at 10%; **  significant  at 5%; ***  significant at 1%
23Appeadlz: Derlvadon oftpropsitdoms
AoposMion 1. The amount of land rented in is strictly increasing in ability, a, and strictly decreasing in
their land endowment  A . Rental markets will thus transfer land to "poor but efficient" producers.
Total differentiating both sides of (l) with respect to a (again,  i is ignored for notation simplicity), yields:
aA Pfl.(14, A) + pa(f,.,lapt3  + f  a  A)  = 0  (Al)
Total differentiation of both sides of (2) or (2)' with respect to a, yields:
ifA  (la,  A)  + pa(f  'a + fA  a)  =0  (A2)
Putting (Al) and (A2) in matrix form yields:
[Paf,,,.  Pof  aAl  [  taa  -pfA
Solving for 8A/8a by Cramer's rule, yield:
apcf,.  - Pfla
8A/Alaa =  P'' |  =  P  P  Af  P  ,  >0  (A3)  (for  fA  >0, f°  . >  0, fl.l. <  0, IHI  ~~~IHI
and we know jJR]>O by the sufficient second order condition of maximization problem.)
This implies that for all households that participate  in rental  narkets  (on either  side), the amount of area
operated will increase with ability.
For  households  renting  in,  the  amount  of  land  rented  in  is  the  difference  between  the  amount  of
opeational land and the land endowment,  i.e.  A,,,  = A - A  (A4).
Total  differentiation  of both sides  of (A4)  with respect  to a,  yields  a  = a  > o  implying that  for aa  da
households  who rent  in  land,  the  amount  of land rented  in  is  increasing  in agricultural  ability.  Total
differentiation  of both  sides  of (A4)  with  respect  to  A,  yield  'A-  = -1 < 0,  implying  that  for  the
households who rent in land,  the amount of land rented in is strictly decreasing in land endowment.
For those households that rent out land,  the amount of land rented out is the difference between the land
endowment and the land used for self-cultivation,  or formally,  A.., = A - A  (A5).Total  differentiation  of both  sides  of (AS) with respect  to a, yields  Aw  = -a  < 0,  which implies
that  for those  households  who rent  out land, the amount of land rented out will decrease  in agricultural
ability.  Total differentiation of both sides of (A5) with respect to  A , yields  aA-*  = 1 > 0, implying tiat
6A-
for those households  who rent out land, the amount rented out is strictly increasing in land endowment.
Proposition  2. Presence of transaction costs drives a wedge between those renting in and those renting out
with any increase in T decreasing  a, and  increasing  a.,  thereby  expanding the range of producers  who
remain  in autarky,  reducing  the number of households  who participate  in rental markets,  as well as the
amount of land transacted through rental markets.
Totally differentiating both sides of equation (1) and (2) with respect to T, yields
&a~~O
paf,,,,  -T+PLf-A PA  T= 
and  paf,.  T- + p  afAA-=-l
We obtain ai  T from the first equation and substitute into the second equation, which yields
aA  -1  2  < 0  (A6)
AT  pa[f  Mf,.,.  -(fA,.)2]
Equation (A6) implies that households who rent in will operate less land as the transaction cost increases.
Total  differentiation  of both  sides  of (A4)  with  respect  to  T yields  Mi  = a  < 0,  implying  that
households who still rent in land will rent in less and as the transaction cost increases.
Totally differentiating both sides of equation (1) and (2)' with respect to T and rearranging terms yields:
aA  1 _  > 0  (A7)
,9T  pa:[fMAA.  -(fA,.  )  ]
Equation (A7) implies that households in the renting  in pool will operate less land as the transaction cost
increases.  Total differentiate both sides of (AS) with respect to T, yield  M  -. '  = _M  < 0,  implies that
aT  iT
households who still rent out land will rent out less as the transaction cost increases.For  households  who  continue  to  rent  in, the  optimal  operational  land holding  can  be  obtained  from
equation (1) and (2) as  A, = A(a,(p,r,T,w). SettingA,  to  A1, yields the identity
A, = A, (a,,  p, r, T, w)  (A8)
Totally differentiating both sides, yields,  d4a  = 'iA dal + aAT dT = 0  (for da, = 0)
8aa,  aT
MI
dTU  =-  da4T  °  (A9)  (for  from  (A)  and  a  from  (A6)),
dT  8A,  8cara
aa
implying
that as the transaction  costs increase more households would change from renting in land to autarky.
Similarly for the households  who continue to rent out land, and based on (1) and (2)', we can derive the
following proposition:
8A 1
daT  4< 0 (A10)  (for  8A  > O from  (A)  and  A,  > °  from  (A7)), dT  - i  8aac  aT
aa
implying
that, as transaction costs increase, more households would change from renting out to autarky.
Proposition  3.  Increases  of the  exogenously  given  wage  for  off-farm  employment  will  increase  the
amount of land transacted  in rental  markets by increasing the amount rented out by households  with low
agricultural ability (who join the off-farm labor force)  and the amount rented in by those with high-ability
(who  specialize  in  agricultural  production).  This  will be  associated  with a  decrease  in  the equilibrium
rental rate which, in a risk-free  environment, will make everybody better off.
Without loss of generality,  we assume  that only the households  who originally rented land out will take
advantage of the increased  off-farm  opportunities.  Those who rented in land  originally will continue  to
rent  in land  and  the  their off-farm  opportunities  are  assumed  to remain  the  same as before.  In other
words,  households  who rented out land before will face  wage increase  while those who rented in land
before will face the same wage with the increase of the overall off-farm opportunities.
For those households  who rented out land, we take the derivative of both sides of equation (1) or equation
(2)' with respect to w, yieldPafl r  a  + POftA  OA
PCfAl'  a+  PCYSM  ,  = O 8w  8w
Obtain  89/7w from the second equation and substitute into the first equation, we will have
8A  fA  < 0  (Al 1)
8W  Pa[(fA,.)
2 fdIfM]
which implies that households  who rented  out land  will use  even less  endowment  for self-cultivation
and  AO,  =  A  - =,  sA,  =  A  > °,  implying  that  amount  of  land  rented  out  by  individual
household is increasing in its off-farm opportunity, as consequence,  aggregate supply of land increases.
If we also assume that off-farm opportunities  will not affect those  households  who originally  rented in,
greater  supply of land due to increases in the wage rate will lead to a decrease in rental rate. To show this
informally,  let  a,, = a,,(a,,..a,,p,wi',r*,T)  be  the  aggregate  rent-in  curve,  and  let
ao,  = a,, (al,...a, p,w°"',r*,T) be  the aggregate  rent-out  curve.  At equilibrium,  set amount of land
rented  in  equals  to  the  amount  of  land  rented  out,  or
a,,,(a 1,...a,Ip,wmf,r*,T)  = a., (a,..  ",p,wou",r*,T)  (A12)
Total differentiate both sides of (Al 1)  by allowing r* and w%"' to vary, yield:
aaow
aa i*dr* = lao  °dr +aao 1 -dw°,  rearrange terms, we will have  dr  &  w  (A13)
8gr  &Out  dw  1 = 5ar  8r*aa.(3
-r *  0-.*
It is  easy to show that the sign  of (A13)  is negative.  We  know  'O  >0  8aaa  >O, a  < 0, and
ut°*  > 0; we just showed that the equilibrium rental rate falls as the off-farm opportunities increases.References:
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